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THE NEW MARITIME STRATEGY
A Lost Opportunity
William T. Pendley
America is in a New Era that began over a decade and a half ago with the col-lapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Like all new eras in
history, this one brings with it both new threats and new opportunities. For the
United States to protect and advance its national interests and assure its survival,
it must adapt to change and put in place a national strategy that will meet these
new challenges. It is important that this new national strategy be supported by a
comprehensive military strategy as well. One element of the military strategy
should be a maritime strategy that provides for the most effective employment
of maritime forces within a joint force strategy. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower (October 2007, available at www.navy.mil/maritime/
MaritimeStrategy.pdf) is the latest in a series of attempts to do so. Unfortu-
nately, like the national strategy publications to which it makes reference, the
latest maritime strategy attempts to be all things to all people and therefore fails
the test for any realistic and viable strategy. It reads more like a public affairs
document developed at town meetings. Even a declaratory strategy requires sev-
eral major elements if it is to be taken seriously.
AN ACCURATE ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
First, a military strategy must provide an accurate analysis of the global security
environment for which it is designed and in which it will be implemented. This
new maritime strategy is at its best in this area. It recognizes the more complex
world of this New Era. It avoids any references to a unipolar world or to America
as the “indispensable nation.” Such arrogant misrepresentations of the interna-
tional system and America’s role have contributed to the failure of U.S.
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administrations to adopt a coherent and effective strategy for nearly ten and a
half years. Many of the difficult situations the United States finds itself facing to-
day result from that failure.
This new maritime strategy envisions a multipolar international system that
may be on the strategic horizon. We are still, more accurately, in a nonpolar
world, in which both nations and nonstate actors exercise a high degree of lati-
tude and in which alliances have lost much of the appeal and reliability that were
present in bipolar and multipolar systems of the past. The major powers today
seek to maintain peaceful and mutually beneficial relationships among them-
selves without losing their freedom of action. None seeks the types of confronta-
tional relationships or targeted alliances that marked the previous century.
Leftover alliance structures from the Cold War have attempted to restructure
and revise their roles and missions to maintain relevance in this New Era.
Recognizing the dramatic change in the global security environment has
been difficult for a generation of foreign policy and national security elites who
were shaped by the experience of the last half of the twentieth century. America
was truly the indispensable nation of the late 1940s and the early Cold War, but
2008 is not 1948. This new maritime strategy makes a positive contribution to
any strategic debate by moving toward a more realistic assessment of the new
global security environment.
THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE NEW ERA
Second, a military strategy must identify and prioritize the threats and opportu-
nities that a new era brings. It is not adequate merely to catalogue threats, which
is what this new maritime strategy does. To be relevant, it must prioritize the
threats in terms of both their timing and danger to American national interests.
The most dangerous and imminent threats to American security and the
safety of the homeland in this New Era are posed by radical Islamic terrorist or-
ganizations and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and means of delivering them. While defeating those threats requires a
comprehensive approach employing integrated political, diplomatic, economic,
and communication strategies, it requires an effective military strategy as well.
Additionally, there are potential threats of being drawn into conflicts in Korea
or the Taiwan Strait, where deterrent strategies have maintained the peace for
over half a century. While these conflicts may seem improbable and deterrable
for the foreseeable future, they cannot be dismissed. Any military strategy must
therefore seek to maintain capabilities that will bolster deterrence and prevail in
any conflict if political solutions fail.
At a secondary level there are the transnational threats of piracy, drugs, and
human trafficking, transshipment of WMD materials, and so forth. Such issues
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are highlighted in the new maritime strategy, since it labels itself a “cooperative
strategy,” and it is at this level that broad maritime cooperation is most feasible.
These are traditional issues of interdiction appropriate for frigates or patrol craft
and coast guard–type forces. This is where the “thousand-ship navy”—or as
others have labeled it, the “thousand-ship coast guard”—has the best chance of
becoming a reality. It is foolhardy, however, to assume that such broad maritime
cooperation will be there for military action required to deal with the
higher-level and more critical threats posed by proliferation or terrorist activi-
ties, not to mention should deterrence fail in the Taiwan Strait or Korea.
This new maritime strategy fails to differentiate clearly and prioritize
present-day threats; accordingly, it lacks an essential focus. Every potential
threat is listed, but a strategy to guide the investment of resources, alliance prior-
ities and force development, basing, and deployments must provide both judg-
ments and assessments, probabilities and priorities. This proposed maritime
strategy fails in this, most conspicuously when it includes terrorism in the same
breath as piracy, drugs, and human trafficking.
To be successful a strategy must also grasp opportunities that arise. The pri-
mary security threats to America being largely focused in that broad Islamic arc
that reaches from Africa to Southeast Asia, there is an opportunity to reduce
America’s military footprint elsewhere. Doing so would counter arguments that
the United States seeks some manner of global hegemony or empire and would
reduce both the political burden for friendly governments and targets for terror-
ist organizations. Such redeployment would also allow for more appropriate uti-
lization and strategic positioning of U.S. forces, including maritime forces.
Given the economic and political progress of Western Europe, it is possible to
transition military leadership within a reformed and expanded NATO. Europe
in 2008 is not the Europe of 1948. America is an Atlantic power, not a European
power. Transition of military leadership and security responsibility in Europe
and redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe would be long overdue recogni-
tions of the political, economic, and security realities on the continent.
In Northeast Asia the same type of transition from a leading military to a sup-
porting one is required. That transition has been slow in coming in Korea, de-
spite the significant economic and political progress there. The alliance with
Japan is a useful model, with the United States clearly in a supporting role in the
military defense of Japan, consolidating and reducing its forces stationed there.
Both countries benefit from a broader political alliance globally while making
necessary adjustments in their military alliance. North Korea is not a significant
threat to the United States. The regional powers—Japan, South Korea, and
China—have far more at stake in peace on the Korean Peninsula and are better
positioned both to maintain that peace and to encourage the type of internal
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change required in North Korea. Northeast Asia of 2008 is not the Northeast
Asia of 1953, and American military presence on the Korean Peninsula that was
for many years essential may now be more a hindrance to progress and peace.
America is a Pacific power, not an Asian power.
The United States was faced with a global challenge twice in the last century.
First America and its allies faced the combination of Nazi Germany, imperial Ja-
pan, and fascist Italy. That was a real axis. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are not in
the same ballpark. Second, the Soviet Union and the communist ideology posed
a global challenge during the Cold War. Attempts today to paint the terrorist
threat as a global threat exaggerate its capabilities. China is the rising state in
Asia, but it too faces severe domestic challenges and resource limitations; in mil-
itary terms, it remains at best a regional power for the foreseeable future. If one
removes the Taiwan issue, it is difficult to construct a realistic scenario for a
Sino-American conflict. America faces no global threat from any nation,
nonstate actor, or ideology, today or for the foreseeable future, that measures up
to those faced in the past.
An effective military strategy must be focused on current strategic realities
and future probabilities. It must deal with the threats that actually exist, not
those it would prefer. It must also reallocate resources, evolve alliance relation-
ships, and reposition forces to take advantage of change and the opportunities it
offers. Because this new maritime strategy fails to identify and prioritize clearly
threats and opportunities, what it advances is far too general and unfocused to
serve as even a relevant declaratory strategy.
ENSURING AMERICAN SECURITY
Third, given that a strategy makes an accurate analysis of the global security en-
vironment and clearly identifies and prioritizes the threats and opportunities of
the era in which it will be implemented, it must also lay out at its core how it will
ensure America’s security. How does it propose to succeed, and how does it differ
from or support the current military strategy? Here this new maritime strategy
is filled with internal contradictions.
The strategy argues that U.S. maritime forces will be “globally postured” and
employ “persistent presence,” while only paragraphs later it admits that “we can-
not be everywhere.” The first argument is obviously designed to support the
maintenance of a powerful and, ideally, larger fleet and other maritime forces.
The later contradictory admission is a recognition of a limitation of the re-
sources that will be available for maritime forces absent a real maritime threat.
The strategy attempts to bridge this obvious disconnect with the theme of co-
operative arrangements, such as the Global Maritime Partnership. Unfortu-
nately, evidence to date is not convincing. Few nations have provided any
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maritime forces to critical maritime operations in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian
Sea, or the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa. These are the very maritime op-
erations for which the strategy seeks a cooperative approach. The recent ending
of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force refueling operations in the Indian
Ocean and the Japanese withdrawal from the region indicate how fragile these
arrangements can be even with America’s closest allies.
While the discussion of international maritime cooperation and a thousand-
ship navy makes for great press at an International Seapower Symposium, such a
concept is not highly significant for an American military strategy. It is marginal
at best and should occupy a paragraph or two focused on piracy, drugs, human
trafficking, and interdiction of nuclear materials. Giving cooperative arrange-
ments such heavy play in the strategy is counterproductive to arguments for
stronger U.S. maritime forces. Critics will note that a thousand-ship navy is far
larger than the six hundred ships the U.S. Navy sought during the height of the
Cold War, when there was a maritime threat.
The strategy lists a host of maritime operations, extending from deterring
major-power conflict to supporting civil authorities in homeland security to
humanitarian operations. Nonetheless, it fails once again to provide any real pri-
oritization or focus. This may reflect the obvious problem of constructing a sin-
gle strategy that includes all three maritime branches: the Marines, the Navy,
and the Coast Guard. While all operate at sea or from the sea, each has a very dif-
ferent focus and priorities. A maritime strategy that attempts to include all three
must break down into separate individual subsections or, as is the case here,
become far too general to be of significant value.
It is unfortunate that this latest attempt does such a good job of recognizing the
change in the global security environment and identifying the broad spectrum of
threats yet fails to provide a real military strategy. It promises to do everything,
without any recognition of resource requirements or competing demands.
A CAPABILITIES-BASED STRATEGY?
The section titled “Implementing the Strategy” provides a list of core capabilities
that U.S. maritime forces should possess: forward presence, deterrence, sea con-
trol, power projection, sea security, and humanitarian activity. There is a discus-
sion of how each operational capability may be used and why it may be needed.
This section is well written and is reminiscent of discussions at the end of the
Cold War, in the waning days of the G. H. W. Bush administration and the early
days of the Clinton administration. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the
strategic threat had disappeared, and without such a threat it was possible for the
defense budget to go into freefall as the nation dreamed of a “peace dividend.”
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Casting about for a new enemy quickly revealed that there was no significant
peer competitor or enemy state on the horizon. Some tried unsuccessfully to
promote China, Japan, or a revived Soviet Union/Russia. Lacking a real conven-
tional enemy any time soon, some proposed building a capabilities-based mili-
tary strategy across a wide range of potential threats that might emerge in the
future. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, with his experience in Congress, quickly
rejected such an approach. Democracies resist investment in militaries if there is
not a real identified threat or strategic rationale related to the interests, safety,
and security of the nation. The 1990s largely became a lost decade in strategic af-
fairs, planning for threats that were not there while ignoring the emerging
threats of the New Era.
Although the core capabilities listed in “Implementing the Strategy” are ones
that any American maritime force should possess, they are, unfortunately, core
capabilities in search of a strategy. The section of the proposed maritime strat-
egy that deals with “Implementation Priorities” deals with management and ad-
ministration of the force. It addresses integration of maritime forces and
interoperability, as well as maritime domain awareness and the preparation of
service personnel. These are all important elements in operating a maritime
force but are not the real priorities for implementation of a strategy. Those pri-
orities should be where forces would be deployed, what roles would be empha-
sized, and what maritime forces should be developed and deployed that would
be most critical to the success of the strategy. The recent leaked memo detailing
three different navies demonstrates both the absence of and the need for a real
maritime strategy that contains such recommended priorities.
The new maritime strategy provides an adequate list of what capabilities a
maritime force should have and states effectively the importance of interoper-
ability, training, and integration of the force. This, however, will allow some to
characterize the document as a capabilities-based, declaratory strategy despite
the fact it lacks even a prioritization of capabilities. Given the fiscal realities,
growing domestic demands, and the fact that the United States faces real and im-
mediate threats, a capabilities-based strategy is not what is needed to make the
tough decisions required for America’s security.
A LOST OPPORTUNITY
The American people have tired of the role of global policeman and its inherent
costs. While they expect their military to develop a strategy to defend the home-
land and U.S. interests, the experiences of Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq make it
highly probable that they will not support another major intervention or
ground war on the Eurasian continent. The American people should expect a
strategy that optimizes U.S. technological superiority and produces quick and
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decisive military actions, not prolonged and seemingly indecisive conflicts.
There are models in this New Era, such as the U.S. operations in the former Yu-
goslavia and the initial removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
A strategy to defeat terrorists that relies primarily on military forces is fatally
flawed. If it also depends on large ground forces, interventions, occupations, and
extended counterinsurgency operations conducted by other than indigenous
forces, it plays to the strengths of the enemy. Such a strategy may initially benefit
from the support of the American people, but as the conflict goes on that sup-
port will wane, giving the terrorists an opportunity for victory—not because of
their military superiority or failure of U.S. forces but because the American
military strategy is fundamentally defective.
A successful strategy for defeating terrorists must be a comprehensive one
that integrates political, diplomatic, economic, and communications means.
The military element of the strategy must concentrate on developing a robust
intelligence system and a capability for timely strikes on targets at extended
ranges with increased accuracy and lethality, from both manned and unmanned
platforms. It must be an offshore strategy that avoids major basing or deploy-
ments inside Islamic nations, relying primarily on the use of special operations
units, smart weapons, robust intelligence, and support for indigenous forces.
While it is accurate to think of this as a long war in which terrorists will largely be
contained or countered, terrorism will not be defeated in a traditional or con-
ventional sense. It would be a serious strategic blunder to be dragged into an ex-
tensive series of military campaigns carried out by major U.S. ground forces
inside the Islamic world.
Such a comprehensive strategy is also required in order to oppose prolifera-
tion. It too must have a military element. There are specific scenarios in which
the threat requires military action to eliminate the development of weapons of
mass destruction or their transfer to terrorists or regimes that support such or-
ganizations. The same offshore military means discussed above are applicable to
halting the threat of proliferation if diplomatic, political, and economic
measures are unsuccessful.
A meaningful military strategy must also defeat any area-denial strategy that
China might employ to counter U.S. capability to meet its commitments to Tai-
wan. Deterrence in both the Taiwan Strait and in Korea depends on American
ability to support their defense. An effective strategy must provide for appropri-
ate forces to enforce sea control if necessary in surrounding areas for both power
projection and direct support.
Finally, any military strategy for the United States must ensure the survival of a
credible strategic nuclear deterrent. The maritime element is the most survivable
strategic nuclear force and thus the most important part of the strategic deterrent.
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The opportunity was there to develop a maritime strategy that would be ef-
fective against terrorist and proliferation threats while supporting deterrence in
Korea and the Taiwan Strait and maintaining America’s strategic nuclear deter-
rent. The United States and its major maritime allies, Great Britain, Japan, and
Australia, are not continental powers. Such an alliance requires a maritime strat-
egy that is based offshore, emphasizes intelligence, and provides for timely and
decisive power projection from both sea-based platforms and land-based sys-
tems with intercontinental range. The absence of any significant discussion of
sea basing is noticeable in this new maritime strategy.
While the purpose of a maritime strategy is to provide for the most effective
use of maritime power to protect and advance U.S. interests, it can and should
highlight the unique contributions that ground and air forces can make within
such an offshore military strategy. It also must provide recognition that Amer-
ica’s means and the will of the American people are not unlimited and that
choices and priorities are therefore required in any realistic military strategy.
While it is easy to be critical of this new maritime strategy, the real problem
that the United States faces is the lack of a coherent national strategy for this
New Era. A national strategy must define the role America will play in the world
and the ends that it will seek. It must also ensure that those ends are in balance
with the will of the people. America’s major challenge today comes not from en-
emies abroad but from neglect of the eroding domestic foundations of national
power. Rebuilding America’s domestic foundations and thus assuring America’s
future as a great power will require major adjustments in U.S. overseas
commitments and military strategy.
It will be difficult, however, to envision a truly realistic and effective military
strategy that deals with the external threats of this New Era until the United
States faces up to the significant changes both in its global and domestic chal-
lenges and puts in place a national strategy. As it is, the maritime strategy pro-
vides a list of current and potential threats and a catalogue of the core
capabilities for maritime forces. Beyond that, unfortunately, it marks a lost op-
portunity to develop a more effective and comprehensive military strategy to
protect and advance America’s interests in this New Era.
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